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Abstract. We give several improvements on the known hardness of the unique shortest vector problem.
– We give a deterministic reduction from the shortest vector problem to the unique shortest vector
problem. As a byproduct, we get deterministic NP-hardness for unique shortest vector problem in
the ℓ∞ norm.
– We give a randomized reduction from SAT to uSVP1+1/poly(n). This shows that uSVP1+1/poly(n) is
NP-hard under randomized reductions.
– We show that if GapSVPγ ∈ co-NP (or co-AM) then uSVP
√
γ ∈ co-NP (co-AM respectively). This
simplifies previously known uSVPn1/4 ∈ co-AM proof by Cai [10] to uSVP(n/ log n)1/4 ∈ co-AM, and
additionally generalizes it to uSVPn1/4 ∈ co-NP.
– We give a deterministic reduction from search-uSVPγ to the decision-uSVPγ/2. We also show that the
decision-uSVP isNP-hard for randomized reductions, which does not follow from Kumar-Sivakumar
[21].
1 Introduction
A lattice is the set of all integer combinations of n linearly independent vectors b1,b2, . . . ,bn in R
m. These
vectors are referred to as a basis of the lattice and n is the rank of the lattice. The successive minima λi(L)
(where i = 1, . . . , n) for the lattice L are among the most fundamental parameters associated to a lattice. The
λi(L) is defined as the smallest value such that a sphere of radius λi(L) centered around the origin contains
at least i linearly independent lattice vectors. Lattices have been investigated by computer scientists for a few
decades after the discovery of the LLL algorithm [22]. More recently, Ajtai [2] showed that lattice problems
have a very desirable property for cryptography i.e., they exhibit a worst-case to average-case reduction. This
property immediately yields one-way functions and collision resistant hash functions, based on the worst case
hardness of lattice problems. This is in a stark contrast to the traditional number theoretic constructions
which are based on the average-case hardness e.g., factoring, discrete logarithms.
We now describe some of the most fundamental and widely studied lattice problems. Given a lattice
L, the γ-approximate shortest vector problem (SVPγ) is the problem of finding a non-zero lattice vector of
length at most γλ1(L). Let the minimum distance of a point t ∈ Rm from a vector of the lattice L be denoted
by d(t,L). Given a lattice L and a point t ∈ Rm, the γ-approximate closest vector problem or CVPγ , is the
problem of finding a v ∈ L such that ‖v − t‖ ≤ γd(t,L).
Besides the search version just described, CVP and SVP also have a decision version. The problem GapCVPγ
is the problem of deciding if, given (B, t, d ∈ R), d(t,L(B)) ≤ d or d(t,L(B)) > γd. Similarly, the problem
GapSVPγ is the problem of deciding if, given (B, d ∈ R), λ1(L(B)) ≤ d or λ1(L(B)) > γd.
The two problems CVP and SVP are quite well studied. We know that they can be solved exactly in
deterministic 2O(n) time [27,5]. They can be approximated within a factor of 2n(log logn)
2/ logn, in polynomial
time, using LLL [22] and subsequent improvements by Schnorr [30] (for details, see the book by Micciancio
and Goldwasser [16]). On the other hand, it is known that there exists c > 0, such that no polynomial
time algorithm can approximate these problems within a factor of nc/ log logn, unless P = NP or another
unlikely scenario is true [12,17,8]. It is also known that both these problems cannot be NP-hard for a factor
of
√
n/ logn or the polynomial hierarchy will collapse.
A variant of SVP that has been especially relevant in cryptography is the unique shortest vector problem
(uSVP). The problem uSVPγ is the problem of finding the shortest non-zero vector of the lattice, given the
promise that λ2(L) ≥ γλ1(L). The security of the first public key cryptosystem by Ajtai-Dwork [1] was based
on the worst-case hardness of uSVPO(n8). In a series of papers [14,29], the uniqueness factor was reduced to
O(n1.5).
In contrast to CVP and SVP, much less is known about the hardness of uSVP. The current NP-hardness
result known for uSVPγ is for γ < 1 + 2
−nc , which is shown by a randomized reduction from SVP [21]. In
[23], it was shown that there is a reduction from uSVPγ to GapSVPγ and also a reduction from GapSVPγ to
uSVP γ
2
√
n/ log n
. From the first reduction, we can conclude that uSVPγ ∈ co-NP if GapSVPγ ∈ co-NP which,
using the result of [6] implies that uSVP√n ∈ co-NP. It is already know from Cai [10] that uSVPn1/4 ∈ co-AM.
A discussion of the proofs and the simplification can be found in Section 5.
Contributions of this paper. In Section 3.1, we give a deterministic polynomial time reduction from
SVP to uSVP achieving similar bounds as [21] for the ℓ2 norm. This implies, unlike [21], that deterministic
NP-hardness of SVP implies deterministic NP-hardness of uSVP. Also, this result shows that the decision
problem duSVP is also NP-hard under randomized reductions. In Section 3.2, we show that a similar idea
gets us NP-hardness proof for uSVP in ℓ∞ norm. In Section 4, we show that uSVP1+1/poly(n) is hard by giving
a randomized reduction of the SVP instance created by Khot [20] to uSVP1+1/poly(n). In Section 5, we show
uSVPc(n)1/4 ∈ co-NP for some c > 0, which implies that uSVPγ cannot be NP-hard for γ ≥ cn1/4 unless
NP = co-NP. In Section 6, we give a search to decision reduction for the unique shortest vector problem,
i.e., a reduction from uSVPγ to duSVPγ/2. The definition of duSVP is implicit in Cai [10]. A comparison of
some of our results with previously known results has been depicted in Figures 1 and 2.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
A lattice basis is a set of linearly independent vectors b1, . . . ,bn ∈ Rm. It is sometimes convenient to think
of the basis as an m × n matrix B, whose n columns are the vectors b1, . . . ,bn. The lattice generated by
the basis B will be written as L(B) and is defined as L(B) = {Bx|x ∈ Zn}. A vector v ∈ L is called a
primitive vector of the lattice L if it is not an integer multiple of another lattice vector except ±v. We will
assume that the lattice is over rationals, i.e., b1, . . . ,bn ∈ Qm, and the entries are represented by the pair
of numerator and denominator.
A shortest vector of a lattice is a non-zero vector in the lattice whose ℓ2 norm is minimal. The length
of the shortest vector is λ1(L(B)), where λ1 is as defined in the introduction. For a vector t ∈ Rm, let
d(t,L(B)) denote the distance of t to the closest lattice point in L(B).
For any lattice L, and any vector v ∈ L, we denote by L⊥v the lattice obtained by projecting L to the
space orthogonal to v.
For an integer k ∈ Z+ we use [k] to denote the set {1, . . . , k}.
2.2 Lattice Problems
In this paper we are concerned with the shortest vector problem and the unique shortest vector problem.
The search and decision versions of the shortest vector problem are defined below.
GapSVPγ: Given a lattice basis B and an integer d, say “YES” if λ1(L(B)) ≤ d and “NO” if λ1(L(B)) > γd.
SVPγ: Given a lattice basis B, find a non-zero vector v ∈ L(B) such that ‖v‖ ≤ γλ1(L(B)).
We now formally define the search and decision unique shortest vector problem. The definition of the decision
version of uSVP is implicit in Cai [10], although, to our knowledge, it has not been explicitly defined anywhere
in the literature.
uSVPγ : Given a lattice basis B such that λ2(L(B)) ≥ γλ1(L(B)), find a vector v ∈ L(B) such that ‖v‖ =
λ1(L(B)).
duSVPγ : Given a lattice basisB and an integer d, such that λ2(L(B)) ≥ γλ1(L(B)), say “YES” if λ1(L(B)) ≤
d and “NO” if λ1(L(B)) > d.
2.3 Defining co-AM and co-NP
The definitions of this section have been adapted from [13].
Definition 1. A promise problemΠ = (ΠYES, ΠNO) is said to be in co-NP if there exists a polynomial-time
recognizable (witness) verification predicate V such that
– For every x ∈ ΠNO, there exists w ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that V (x,w) = 1.
– For every x ∈ ΠYES and every w ∈ {0, 1}∗, V (x,w) = 0.
3
Definition 2. A promise problem Π = (ΠYES, ΠNO) is said to be in co-AM if there exists a polynomial-
time recognizable verification predicate V and polynomials p, q such that for every x ∈ ΠYES ∪ ΠNO with
|x| = n, and y chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}p(n),
– If x ∈ ΠNO, then there exists w ∈ {0, 1}q(n), such that Pr (V (x, y, w) = 1) ≥ 23 .
– If x ∈ ΠYES, then for all w ∈ {0, 1}q(n), Pr (V (x, y, w) = 1) ≤ 13 .
3 A deterministic polynomial time reduction from SVP to uSVP
Let us suppose that B = [b1 b2 . . . bn] is the input lattice. The Gram Schmidt orthogonalization of B,
denoted as {b˜1, . . . , b˜n}, is defined as
b˜i = bi −
i−1∑
j=1
µi,jb˜j , where µi,j =
〈bi, b˜j〉
〈b˜j , b˜j〉
.
Definition 3. A basis B = {b1, . . . ,bn} is a δ-LLL reduced basis [22] if the following holds:
– ∀ 1 ≤ j < i ≤ n, |µi,j | ≤ 12 ,
– ∀ 1 ≤ i < n, δ‖b˜i‖2 ≤ ‖µi+1,ib˜i + b˜i+1‖2.
We choose δ = 34 and then, from the above definition, for a δ-LLL reduced basis, ∀ 1 ≤ i < n, ‖b˜i‖ ≤√
2‖b˜i+1‖. This implies that
‖b˜1‖ ≤ 2(i−1)/2‖b˜i‖ .
Since there is an efficient algorithm [22] to compute an LLL-reduced basis, we assume, unless otherwise
stated, that the given basis is always LLL-reduced and hence satisfies the above mentioned properties.
Lemma 1. For an LLL reduced basis B, if u =
∑
i
αibi is a shortest vector, then |αi| < 23n/2 for all i ∈ [n].
Proof. We show by induction that for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, |αn−i| ≤ 2n/2+i. Since u is the shortest vector of L(B),
‖u‖ ≤ ‖b1‖. Also, since the projection of u in the direction of b˜n is αnb˜n,
‖b˜1‖ ≥ ‖u‖ ≥ |αn|‖b˜n‖
≥ 2−(n−1)/2|αn|‖b˜1‖ .
This implies that |αn| ≤ 2(n−1)/2.
Now assume that |αn−i| ≤ 2n/2+i for 0 ≤ i < k. Then, using the fact that ‖u‖ ≤ ‖b1‖ and that the
projection of u in the direction of b˜n−k is

αn−k + ( n∑
j=n−k+1
µj,n−kαj)

 b˜n−k, we get that
‖b˜1‖ ≥ ‖u‖ ≥ |

αn−k + ( n∑
j=n−k+1
µj,n−kαj)

 |‖b˜n−k‖
≥ 2−(n−k−1)/2|

αn−k + ( n∑
j=n−k+1
µj,n−kαj)

 |‖b˜1‖ .
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Therefore,
|αn−k| ≤ 2(n−k−1)/2 +
n∑
j=n−k+1
|µj,n−kαj |
≤ 2(n−k−1)/2 +
k−1∑
j=0
1
2
|αn−j |
≤ 2(n−k−1)/2 + 1
2
k−1∑
j=0
2n/2+j
≤ 2(n−k−1)/2 + 1
2
2n/2+k ≤ 2n/2+k .
⊓⊔
3.1 Deterministic reduction from SVP to uSVP
Given an instance of SVP(B, d), we define a new lattice L(B
′
) as follows.


b1 b2 . . . bn
1
22n2
0 . . . 0
0 2
2n
22n2
. . . 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 2
2n2−2n
22n2


So, (b
′
i)
T = [bTi 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
22(i−1)n
22n2
0 . . . 0], where the (m + i)’th entry is non-zero. For a vector
v =
∑n
i αibi ∈ L(B), we call v′ =
∑n
i αib
′
i as the corresponding vector.
Lemma 2. For the new basis B
′
, λ21(L(B)) ≤ λ21(L(B
′
)) ≤ λ21(L(B)) + 2−n/2.
Proof. The first inequality follows from the fact that the length of the vectors can’t get shorter in L(B
′
).
For the second inequality, let v be a shortest vector in L = L(B) such that v =
n∑
i
αibi. Then from Lemma
1, |αi| < 23n/2, and hence
‖
n∑
i=1
αib
′
i‖2 < λ21(L) +
n−1∑
i=0
α2i+1
24in
24n2
< λ21(L) + 2
3n 2
4n2 − 1
(24n − 1)24n2
< λ21(L) + 2
−n/2 .
⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Let v1,v2 ∈ L(B) be two distinct vectors such that ‖v1‖ = ‖v2‖ = λ1(L(B)) and let v′1,v
′
2 ∈
L(B
′
) be the corresponding vectors. Then, |‖v′1‖2 − ‖v
′
2‖2| > 2−4n
2
Proof. Let v1 =
n∑
i=1
αibi and v2 =
n∑
i=1
βibi. Let j ∈ [n] be the largest number such that αj 6= βj . Then,
5
|‖v′1‖2 − ‖v
′
2‖2| = |
n∑
i=1
(α2i − β2i )(
22(i−1)n
22n2
)2|
> |(α2j − β2j ) ·
24(j−1)n
24n2
+
j−1∑
i=1
(α2i − β2i ) ·
24(i−1)n
24n2
|
>
24(j−1)n
24n2
− 23n
j−1∑
i=1
24(i−1)n
24n2
=
24(j−1)n
24n2
− 23n 2
4(j−1)n − 1
24n2(24n − 1)
>
1
24n2
.
⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Let v,v1,v2 be vectors in an integer lattice L = L(B).
– If ‖v1‖ > ‖v2‖, then ‖v1‖2 − ‖v2‖2 ≥ 1.
– If ‖v‖ > λ1(L), then if v′ ∈ L(B′) is the corresponding vector, then ‖v′‖2 > λ21(B) + 1.
Proof. The first item follows from the fact that for integer lattices the ℓ22 norm of a vector is also an integer.
The second item follows from the fact that v is not the shortest vector in L(B) and ‖v′‖2 > ‖v‖2. ⊓⊔
Without loss of generality, we can assume L(B) to be an integer lattice, and hence, using the above
lemma, we get the following result.
Theorem 1. Given a lattice L = L(B), there is a deterministic polynomial reduction transforming it to
another lattice L′ = L(B
′
) such that λ2(L
′)
λ1(L′)
>
√
1 + 1
c·24n2λ21(L)
for some c ≤ 1/4. In particular, duSVP is
NP-hard under randomized reductions.
Proof. From Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we have that λ22(L
′) − λ21(L′) > 2−4n
2
, which implies λ2(L
′)
λ1(L′)
>√
1 + 1
24n2λ21(L
′)
. From Lemma 2, λ21(L
′) < λ21(L) +
1
2n/2
, and hence λ2(L
′)
λ1(L′)
is at least 1 + c
24n2λ21(L)
, for
some constant c ≤ 14 . ⊓⊔
We would like to point out that we assumed in Lemma 4 that the lattice L is an integer lattice. Hence,
λ1(L) can be O(2
cn · input size) and hence, λ2(L
′
)
λ1(L
′)
can be arbitrarily close to 1. The original Kumar-
Sivakumar [21] proof also suffers with the same problem. The idea there is to show that the number of
lattice points in a ball centered at the origin and of radius
√
2λ1(L) is at most 2
n. Then one can create a
new lattice L
′
with a unique short vector v with λ1(L) ≤ ||v|| <
√
2λ1(L). In the worst case, the ratio of
λ22(L
′
) and λ21(L
′
) for the new lattice (assuming that the original lattice was integer lattice) can be as small
as
2λ21(L)
2λ21(L)−1 , which is (1 +
1
2λ21(L)
). As λ1(L) is O(2
cn · input size), we get (1 + 1/exp) hardness of uSVP in
both cases.
3.2 Deterministic hardness of uSVP in ℓ∞ norm
In this section, we show that the uSVP problem is NP-hard in the ℓ∞ norm. For simplicity of description,
we assume that all norms in this section are ℓ∞ norms. Also, as before, the lattice L is an integer lattice.
For the LLL reduced basis {b˜1, . . . , b˜n}, there is a constant c such that ‖b˜1‖ ≤ 2c(i−1)‖b˜i‖, for all i ∈ [n].
An induction proof as in Lemma 1 gives the following corollary.
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Corollary 1. If the basis B is LLL reduced then for the shortest vector u =
∑
i αibi, one has that for all i,
|αi| < 2(c+1)n, for some constant c.
We use the following theorem by P. van Emde Boas [7].
Theorem 2. The problem SVP in ℓ∞ norm is NP-hard.
Now we prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 3. The problem uSVP in ℓ∞ norm is NP-hard.
Proof. We take the instance resulting from Theorem 2 and make the shortest vector unique. Let η = (c+1)n,
then for all i ∈ [n], |αi| < 2η. Given the basis {b1, . . . ,bn}, we perturb the basis slightly in the following way.
The basis vector bi gets
22(i−1)η
22η2
added to each of its entries. For the new lattice L
′
, we have the following
easy to prove observations. The theorem follows from them.
– If v =
∑
i αibi ∈ L is a shortest vector then the vector v
′
=
∑
i αib
′
i ∈ L
′
. Also,
λ1(L
′
) ≤ ‖v′‖ ≤ λ1(L) +
n∑
i=1
αi
22(i−1)η
22η2
= λ1(L) + 2
1−η.
– Let v1,v2 ∈ L and ‖v1‖ > ‖v2‖, then ‖v1‖ − ‖v2‖ ≥ 1, as L is an integer lattice.
– Let v =
∑
i∈[n] αibi ∈ L and let bi,j be the j’th entry of bi. If v
′
is the vector corresponding to v in L
′
and ‖v′‖ = |∑i∈[n] αib′i,j |, for some j ∈ [m], then ‖v‖ = |∑i∈[n] αibi,j | for the same j . This follows
from the fact that the
∑
i∈[n] αibi,j for all j is an integer, and hence will either be equal to ‖v‖ or will
be at most ‖v‖ − 1.
– Let v1,v2 ∈ L such that ‖v1‖ = ‖v2‖ = λ1(L) then |‖v′1‖ − ‖v
′
2‖| > |
∑
i(αi − βi)2
2(i−1)η
22η2
|. Similarly, as
in Lemma 3, we get that |‖v′1‖ − ‖v
′
2‖| > 2−2η
2
.
⊓⊔
4 Hardness of uSVP within 1 + 1/nc
The following is a result obtained by letting η = 140 , p = 2, and k = 1 in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 5.1 of
[20].
Lemma 5. For some fixed constants c1, c2, there exists a polynomial time reduction from a SAT instance of
size n to an SVP instance (B, d) where B is a 2N ×N integer matrix with N ≤ nc2 , and d ≤ nc1 such that:
1. If the SAT instance is a YES instance, then with probability at least 9/10, there exists a non-zero x ∈ ZN ,
such that ‖x‖ ≤ d3 and ‖Bx‖ ≤
√
7
8d.
2. If the SAT instance is a NO instance, then with probability at least 9/10, for any non-zero x ∈ ZN ,
‖Bx‖ ≥ √d.
We state below lemma 4 from [21].
Lemma 6. Let T 6= ∅ be a finite set of size at most 2m, and let T = T0 ⊇ T1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ T2m be a sequence of
subsets of T defined by a probabilistic process that satisfies the following three properties:
1. For all k, 0 ≤ k < 2m, and all x ∈ T , Pr(x ∈ Tk+1|x ∈ Tk) = 12 .
2. For all x ∈ T , 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ < 2m, Pr(x ∈ Tℓ+1|x ∈ Tℓ, x ∈ Tk) = Pr(x ∈ Tℓ+1|x ∈ Tℓ).
3. For all k, 0 ≤ k < 2m, and all x, y ∈ Tk, x 6= y, the events “x ∈ Tk+1” and “y ∈ Tk+1” are independent.
Then, with probability 23 − 2−m, one of the Tk’s has exactly one element.
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The following result is a simpler version of Corollary 3 from [21].
Lemma 7. Given any arbitrary lattice L of rank n, the number of lattice points in L of length λ1(L) is at
most 2n+1.
Proof. Let B = (b1, . . . ,bn) be the basis of L. We claim that for any two vectors u 6= ±v ∈ L of length
λ1(L), where u =
n∑
i=1
αibi and v =
n∑
i=1
βibi, there exists an i such that αi 6≡ βi (mod 2). Note that this
claim implies the desired result.
Assume, on the contrary, that there exist a u =
n∑
i=1
αibi and v =
n∑
i=1
βibi such that ‖u‖ = ‖v‖ = λ1(L)
and αi ≡ βi (mod 2) for all i. This implies that u+v2 ∈ L and u−v2 ∈ L. Also,
‖u+ v
2
‖2 + ‖u− v
2
‖2 = ‖u‖
2 + ‖v‖2 + 2〈u,v〉
4
+
‖u‖2 + ‖v‖2 − 2〈u,v〉
4
=
‖u‖2 + ‖v‖2
2
= (λ1(L))
2
.
Since, u 6= ±v, this implies that 0 < ‖u+v2 ‖ < λ1(L) and 0 < ‖u−v2 ‖ < λ1(L), which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
We now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4. For some fixed constants c1, c2, c, there exists a polynomial time reduction from a SAT instance
of size n to a sequence of lattice basis Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N + 2, and d, where Bi’s are 2N ×N integer matrices
with N ≤ nc2 , and d ≤ nc1 such that:
1. If the SAT instance is a YES instance, then with probability at least 1/2, there exists an i such that
L(Bi) has a 1 +
1
Nc -unique shortest vector of length at most
√
7
8d.
2. If the SAT instance is a NO instance, then with probability at least 9/10, for all i, the shortest vector of
L(Bi) is of length at least
√
d.
Proof. Given a SAT instance, consider the pair (B, d) using the reduction from Lemma 5.
We generate, as in [21], a sequence of lattices L(B0),L(B1), . . . ,L(B2N+2) inductively as follows. Suppose
we have generated L(B) = L(B0),L(B1), . . . ,L(Bk) for some 0 ≤ k < 2N+2. We now show how to generate
Bk+1. Let Bk = (b1, . . . ,bN ). Pick a subset W ⊆ [N ] uniformly at random from all subsets of [N ]. If W is
empty, then let Bk+1 = Bk. Otherwise, pick any i from W . For j /∈ W , let b′j = bj , and for j ∈W \ {i}, let
b′j = bj − bi. Finally, let b′i = 2bi and Bk+1 = (b′1,b′2, . . . ,b′N ).
Note that each of the Bi’s are 2N ×N integer matrices. Also, since L(Bi) ⊆ L(B) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 2N +2,
therefore, if the SAT instance is a NO instance, then, by Lemma 5, with probability 9/10, the shortest vector
of L(Bi) is of length at least
√
d for all i.
Now, consider the case when the SAT instance is a YES instance. In this case, by Lemma 5, with
probability 9/10, we have 1 ≤ λ1(L(B)) ≤
√
7
8d, since, B is an integer matrix. The set T is a subset of L(B)
defined as follows:
T = {v ∈ L(B) | ‖v‖ = λ1(L(B))} .
Furthermore, we define the sets Ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N + 2 as Ti = T ∩ L(Bi). By Lemma 7, |T | ≤ 2N+1. The
sets Ti, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N + 2 satisfy the conditions of Lemma 6 for m = N + 1. Thus, by Lemma 6, with
probability 23 − 2−N−1, there exists a 0 ≤ k ≤ 2N + 2 such that |Tk| = 1. Note that Bi is an integer matrix
for all i. Thus, since |T ∩ L(Bk)| = 1, we see that
λ2(L(Bk)) ≥ λ1(L(Bk)) + 1 ≥ λ1(L(Bk))(1 +
√
8
7d
) .
Thus, there exists a constant c (which can be computed in terms of c1 and c2) such that with probability
9
10 · (23 − 2−N−1) > 12 , there exists a k such that L(Bk) has a (1 + 1Nc )-unique shortest vector of length at
most
√
7
8d. This concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
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5 From GapSVP ∈ co-NP (co-AM) to duSVP ∈ co-NP (co-AM)
We now simplify and generalize the uSVPn1/4 ∈ co-AM proof by Cai [10]. We first give a simplified description
of Cai’s proof that uses the idea of the co-AM proof of [13]. Here, one needs to give a co-AM proof that
given a lattice L with n1/4-unique shortest vector and an integer d, λ1(L) > d. The protocol is as follows. The
verifier generates uniform random points pi ∈ L for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , log2(mini ||bi||)}. For each i the verifier
generates a random point zi ∈ B(pi, 2i−1t
√√
n− 14 ). The verifier then sends these points to the prover.
The prover then provides the claimed shortest vector v (primitive vector) and for the correct range when
2it < ||v|| ≤ 2i+1t, the correct point pi (mod v) which is in L. If λ1(L) > d then the prover can send the
correct shortest vector v and for the corresponding i the balls corresponding to different choices of p ∈ L are
disjoint or identical depending on whether the respective centers are congruent modulo the shortest vector
v. So, the prover has no trouble in providing the proof when λ1(L) > d. If on the other hand λ1(L) ≤ d and
||v|| > d, it must be a multiple of the shortest vector or much longer than λ1(L). In this case, the balls have
lot of overlap and the prover will be caught with high probability.
We show that the above idea can be generalized for any co-NP or co-AM proof, i.e., we show that for
any factor γ, if GapSVPγ ∈ co-NP then duSVPc√γ is in co-NP (and similarly for co-AM). This implies, using
the result of Aharonov and Regev [6] that GapSVP√n ∈ co-NP, that duSVPcn 14 ∈ co-NP, and any subsequent
improvements in the factor for GapSVP will imply an improvement for duSVP.
Lemma 8. Let L be a lattice such that λ2(L) ≥ γλ1(L), and let v be a primitive vector in L. Then:
– If ‖v‖ 6= λ1(L), then λ1(L⊥v) ≤ ‖v‖γ .
– If ‖v‖ = λ1(L), then λ1(L⊥v) ≥
(√
γ2 − 14
)
‖v‖.
Proof. If ‖v‖ 6= λ1(L) and v is primitive, then ‖v‖ ≥ λ2(L) ≥ γλ1(L). Let u be the shortest vector in L.
Then the projection of u in the space orthogonal to v (say u′ ∈ L⊥v) is of length at most ‖u‖ = λ1(L).
Also, u is not parallel to v, and hence, u′ 6= 0. This implies
λ1(L⊥v) ≤ λ1(L) ≤ ‖v‖
γ
.
If ‖v‖ = λ1(L), then let u′ be the shortest vector in L⊥v. Let u′ be the projection of u ∈ L orthogonal
to v. Then u = u′+αv for some α ∈ R. Since u−⌊α⌉v ∈ L is not an integer multiple of v, ‖u−⌊α⌉v‖ ≥
λ2(L) ≥ γ‖v‖. Thus,
γ‖v‖ ≤ ‖u′ + (α− ⌊α⌉)v‖ ≤
√
‖u′‖2 + 1
4
‖v‖2 ,
because u′ is orthogonal to v. This implies that
λ1(L⊥v) = ‖u′‖ ≥
(√
γ2 − 1
4
)
‖v‖ .
⊓⊔
Theorem 5. If GapSVP
γ
√
γ2− 14
∈ co-NP, then duSVPγ ∈ co-NP.
Proof. Let (B, d) be an instance of duSVPγ . Assume a witness for recognizing λ1(L(B)) > d to be a vector
v and a string w. The verification predicate V on input (B, d,v, w) outputs 1 if and only if v is a primitive
vector of L = L(B), ‖v‖ > d, and the verification predicate V ′ for proving GapSVPγ′ ∈ co-NP, (where
γ′ = γ
√
γ2 − 14 ) on input (B′, ‖v‖γ , w) outputs 1, where B′ is a basis for L⊥v.
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CASE 1: (B, d) is a “NO” instance, i.e. λ1(L) > d.
In this case, let v be the shortest vector in L, and w is the witness output in the proof of GapSVPγ′ ∈
co-NP for input (B′, ‖v‖γ ).
Since λ1(L) > d, v is a primitive vector of L with length greater than d. Also, from Lemma 8, λ1(L⊥v) ≥(√
γ2 − 14
)
‖v‖ = γ′ ‖v‖γ .
Thus, the verification predicate V outputs 1.
CASE 2: (B, d) is a “YES” instance, i.e. λ1(L) ≤ d.
In this case, let us assume that there exists a witness v, w such that V outputs 1.
Thus, v is a primitive vector with ‖v‖ > d. This implies that ‖v‖ 6= λ1(L), and using Lemma 8,
λ1(L⊥v) ≤ ‖v‖γ . Therefore, V ′, and hence V , output 0, which is a contradiction.
⊓⊔
This result, along with the result of [6] implies the following:
Corollary 2. There exists c > 0 such that duSVPcn1/4 ∈ NP ∩ co-NP.
Note that essentially the same idea as in Theorem 5 can be used to show that
Theorem 6. If GapSVP
γ
√
γ2− 14
∈ co-AM, then duSVPγ ∈ co-AM.
Thus, using the result of [13], this implies the following:
Corollary 3. There exists c > 0 such that duSVPc( nlog n )1/4 ∈ NP ∩ co-AM.
6 A deterministic reduction from uSVPγ to duSVPγ/2
The following lemma is taken from the uSVP to GapSVP reduction given in [23].
Lemma 9. Let L = L0 be a lattice of rank n ≥ 2 given by its basis vectors, and let u be the shortest non-zero
vector of L. If there exists an efficient algorithm that computes a basis for Li+1, a sub-lattice of Li such that
Li+1 6= Li and u ∈ Li+1 for all i ≥ 0, then there exists an efficient algorithm that computes a basis for a
sublattice L˜ of L of rank n− 1 such that u ∈ L˜.
Proof. Let B be the given basis for L, let S be a basis for the sublattice Lt for some t > n(n+ log2 n), and
let D be the dual basis of S. Since Li+1 is a sub-lattice of Li for all i, we have that det(S) ≥ 2tdet(B),
which implies det(D) ≤ 1/ (2tdet(B)). By Minkowski’s bound [26], we have λ1(L(D)) ≤
√
ndet(D)1/n, which
implies that using the LLL algorithm [22], we can find a vector v ∈ L(D) such that
‖v‖ ≤ 2nλ1(L(B)) ≤ 2
n
√
n
2t/ndet(B)1/n
.
Also, using Minkowski’s bound, we have ‖u‖ ≤ √ndet(B)1/n. This implies that
|〈u,v〉| ≤ ‖u‖‖v‖ ≤ n · 2n−t/n < 1 .
But u ∈ L(D) and v ∈ L(S), and thus |〈u,v〉| is an integer, which implies 〈u,v〉 = 0, i.e., u is perpen-
dicular to v. Thus, by taking the projection of L perpendicular to v, we get a lattice L˜ in rank n − 1 such
that u ∈ L˜. ⊓⊔
Lemma 10. Let γ ≥ 2 and L be a lattice such that λ2(L) ≥ γλ1(L). Then, given any sublattice L′ of L
containing the shortest non-zero vector u of L and an oracle that solves duSVPγ/2, there exists an algorithm
that computes a sublattice L′′(6= L′) of L′ such that u ∈ L′′.
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Proof. Using the duSVPγ/2 oracle, we can estimate ‖u‖ within a factor of 2 using binary search. Thus, let d
be such that d/2 < ‖u‖ ≤ d.
Let B = (b1,b2, . . . ,bn) be a basis for L
′ and let u = α1b1 + · · ·+ αnbn be the shortest vector of L for
some αi ∈ Z. Note that since L′ is a sub-lattice of L, λ2(L′) ≥ λ2(L).
Consider three basis as follows:
B1 = (2b1,b2,b3, . . . ,bn) ,
B2 = (b1, 2b2,b3, . . . ,bn) ,
B3 = (b1 + b2, 2b2,b3, . . . ,bn) .
It is easy to see that 2u belongs to each of L(B1), L(B2), and L(B3). Also, since these are sub-lattices
of L(B), λ2(L(Bi)) ≥ λ2(L(B)). This implies that λ2(L(Bi)) ≥ γ2λ1(L(Bi)) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Thus, using the
duSVPγ/2 oracle, we can check whether λ1(L(Bi)) ≤ d, or λ1((L(Bi)) > d, and hence whether u ∈ L(Bi) or
not.
It is sufficient to prove that u ∈ L(Bi) for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. If α1 is even, then u ∈ L(B1), and if α2 is
even, then u ∈ L(B2). If α1 and α2 are both odd, then u = α1(b1+b2)+ α2−α12 (2b2)+α3b3+ · · ·+αnbn ∈
L(B3). ⊓⊔
Thus, given a uSVPγ instance L(B) of rank n, using Lemma 10, we can obtain a sequence of sub-lattices
(where each lattice is a strict sub-lattice of the previous one) such that each of these contains the shortest
vector of L(B). Then, using Lemma 9, we obtain a basis of a sublattice of L(B) of rank n−1, still containing
the shortest vector of L(B). Repeating this procedure, we obtain a basis of a sublattice of L(B) of rank 1
containing the shortest vector of L(B), which will be the vector u. We thus obtain the following result.
Theorem 7. For any γ ≥ 2, there exists an algorithm that solves uSVPγ given a duSVPγ/2 oracle.
7 Discussion and open problems
Many interesting problems related to uSVP remain. The gap between the uniqueness factor (1 + 1
poly
), for
which we know that the uSVP is hard, and ( nlogn )
1/4, for which we know that the problem is in co-AM is
still large. It will be interesting to try to show hardness of uSVP for some constant factor.
The decision version of uSVP was not known to beNP-hard, as it does not follow from Kumar-Sivakumar’s
work [21]. Our deterministic reduction from SVP succeeds in showing the NP-hardness of the decision version
but this hardness cannot be concluded even for a factor of (1+ 1
poly
) hardness, which remains an open problem.
The search to decision equivalence of duSVP and uSVP upto a factor of 2, shows that the complexity of the
two problems is not too far apart. It is interesting to try to improve the factor of 2, but this might require
substantially new ideas. It is a major open question whether such a search to decision reduction is possible
in the case of approximation versions of the shortest vector problem and the closest vector problem.
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